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Introduction

Celebrated by President Truman as the "the greatest combat general ever," General James
Van Fleet played a major role in American history from World War I to the Korean War.
Despite these accomplishments, he remains to this day a neglected figure in the study of early
twentieth century American military and diplomatic history. Although he would have
considered himself primarily a soldier, his many assignments around the world required him to
wield diplomatic talents that would have earned the admiration of foreign policy giants from
Metternich to Molotov. There can be no doubt that he is a figure as worthy of study as Marshall,
Eisenhower, and Bradley.
The objective of this study is to examine and assess the major decisions and impact of
General James Van Fleet in his role as executor of the Truman Doctrine during the Greek Civil
War from the period of February 1948 to the early part of 1950. Though only in charge of the
military side of the Truman Doctrine, Van Fleet often bettered his political and diplomatic
counterparts in their own arenas.

As

the economic and military objectives of the Truman

Doctrine aid program became increasingly political, Van Fleet successfully assumed the new
role of soldier-diplomat and bridged the political and ideological differences of the competing
interests during the Greek Civil War by being both prudent and aggressive, both accommodating
and forceful. Additionally, this study seeks to provide an individualized account of Van Fleet's
role in Greece and assess its broader implications for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.
In particular it seeks to reexamine the historical mythology that has developed around Van Fleet
and his supposed influence on Greek politics during this period.
General Van Fleet was born in Coytesville, New Jersey in 1892. A graduate of West
Point, Van Fleet served in World War One as a battalion commander and later as an ROTC
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instructor at the University ofFlorida during the interwar period. There he earned a reputation as
a great football coach which later played a significant role in his style ofleadership. In World
War II he served during the D-Day landings at Utah Beach, at Cherbourg, and was later posted to
Germany. In late 1947 he was asked by Secretary ofState George Marshall to assume command
ofthe military aid program in Greece that had been announced earlier that year as a part ofthe
Truman Doctrine.
The announcement ofthe Truman Doctrine was one ofthe most significant events in the
history ofAmerican foreign relations and the early Cold War era With the rise ofthe new
bipolar world, it was both figuratively and literally, the first "shots" fired during the Cold War.
In 1947, the Greek government was on the verge of:financial and political collapse. A civil war
had been raging there intermittingly for several years. The Anglo-American backed government
was fighting a guerrilla force believed to be supported by the Soviet Union. As Great Britain
was no longer capable ofcontinuing the economic and military assistance necessary to prop up
the regime in Athens, it was forced to announce its withdrawal in February 1947. Tensions in
Turkey over Soviet access to the Dardanelles Straits provoked further concerns for the Anglo
American bloc. The Truman Administration, fearing the inevitable power vacuum that would
emerge in Greece and Turkey and its implications for the region, agreed to move in and asswne
responsibility for the crisis. Economic and military aid would be provided to help stabilize the
fledgling Greek regime.
In his speech to Congress on March 12, 1947, President Truman uttered the famous
sentence, "I believe it must be the policy ofthe United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. " 1 These words
"The Truman Doctrine." 12 March 1947, Truman Library Public Papers, May 2010; available from
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php ?pid=2 l 89&st=&stl =.
1
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were charged with passionate intensity and were framed as a global Manichean struggle within
the bipolar world that emerged from World War II. This speech was the genesis of a new era in
American foreign policy. The Truman Doctrine was a policy conceived in self-interest yet
cloaked in rhetoric that would accompany a moralistic crusade. The practical limitations of the
policy's idealism became all too familiar themes as subsequent events unfolded. Major-General
Livesay was appointed to head the first military aid missions but his early efforts were largely
unsuccessful and in late 1947, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson recommended a change
in policy and personnel. Van Fleet was selected to replace Livesay. General Van Fleet was
appointed Chief of the U.S. Anny Group, American Mission to Greece (USAGAMG) and as
Director of Joint U.S. Military Advisory Planning Group, Greece (WSMAPG) on February 6
1948. During his tenure, Van Fleet wielded his military, political, and diplomatic talents
simultaneously to ensure the efficient and effective implementation of the Truman Doctrine.
Summary of Existing Literature
Traditionally, historians of the Cold War have fallen into one of three dominant schools
of thought: Orthodox, Revisionist, and Post-Revisionist/Neo-Orthodox.2 After decades of
controversy and fairly vitriolic debate, contemporary scholarship has finally reached a point
where disagreements are fewer and consensus is greater. This new perspective is now known as
the Post-Revisionist consensus.3 The Orthodox school emphasized the role of Joseph Stalin's
grand designs and the Soviet Union's aggressive policies as one of the primary causes of the
Cold War. The revisionists argue that it was the United States that was at fault. The Post
Revisionist school offers a more balanced and nuanced accounts of the origins of the Cold War.
2

For a detailed discussion of the Cold War and its historiography, see J. Samuel Walker, "Historians and Cold War
Origins: The New Consensus," American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review (Westport: Greenwood
Press, 1981), 206-236.
3

Ibid.
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It is an approach which attempts to assess the influence of a number of different forces in the rise
of the American-Soviet conflict including economic structures and bureaucratic politics. This
study, though not primarily concerned with the origins of the Cold War, will operate within the
general analytical framework established by this school of thought.
As this study seeks to understand the personality and role of General Van Fleet in the
formulation and execution of policy in Greece, it relies significantly on his personal papers that
are housed at the George C. Marshall Foundation Library at the Virginia Military Institute in
Lexington, Virginia. Additionally, the papers of one of his aides, James Russel Stephens, were
also consulted. Combined, they form an extensive collection that provides a wealth of
information about the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Planning Group, Greece (WSMAPG), the
British Military Mission (BMM), and their working relationship with the Greek Army and
government. Personal and official correspondence, minutes of meetings, and official documents
from the collection were used to both recreate the narrative of events while also providing
additional insights into the rationale behind many of the decisions made on the ground in Greece.
In addition to the Van Fleet papers, this study consults the standard primary documents of
the era including the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series.
Supplementary material from the Harry S. Truman Library was used in examining the
ideological foundations of the Truman Doctrine. These materials include official memorandum,
personal correspondence, speeches, press conference transcripts, and oral histories conducted by
previous scholars all available at the library. The standard memoirs of the era were consulted to
offer additional perspectives on the early Cold War era and the origins of the Truman Doctrine.
There has been little secondary analysis of the life and career of General James Van
Fleet. Several biographical studies have been planned but most of them have been abandoned
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during their early stages. The only published biography available is Paul Braim's The Will to
Win. Though it provides a fascinating narrative, it is not a scholarly biography and was written
from the point of view of one of Van Fleet's previous subordinates in consultation with the U.S.
Army. It represents an orthodox account of the Truman Doctrine and the United State's role in
the Greek Civil War. A scholarly examination of his career has yet to be seen outside of brief
appearances in the standard studies of the Truman Doctrine aid program. This study hopes to fill
this gap in the historiography of the Cold War by providing an individualized account of Van
Fleet's role while synthesizing it with the existing scholarship.
Although there is no shortage of available literature on the Truman Doctrine, there are
some particular titles that warrant special attention. John Lewis Gaddis, in bis excellent study
published in 1972, The Origins ofthe Cold War, reinvigorated the discipline of Cold War
studies. While he embraced some of the arguments put forward by the revisionists that the
United States and the Soviet Union were equally responsible for the origins of the Cold War, he
does suggest that Stalin was more culpable than Truman because of the absence of any
democratic institutional restraints in the Soviet Union. Roosevelt and Truman's constant battle
with Congress and popular opinion hindered the sort of unitary absolute decision making that
characterized Soviet Russia. This is especially true with respect to the Truman Doctrine.
Previous problems in dealing with Stalin left Truman and his team with a sour taste and a
fundamental sense of distrust. By exploring the impact of these political personalities,
institutional restraints, and the effects of bureaucratic chicanery and "inertia," Gaddis offers one
of the most balanced and exhaustive portraits of the early Cold War. This study will operate
within the general Cold War historical framework established by Gaddis and the post-revisionist
school that he represents.
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One of the most moderate and balanced revisionist accounts of the Truman Doctrine is
Thomas G. Patterson's Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins
of the Cold War published in 1979. Patterson explores the American ideology of "peace and
prosperity" and how it guided American foreign policy from the beginning of World War II
through the early Cold War. This ideology emphasized the need for the United States to break
with its previous non-interventionism/isolationism and intervene in the internal affairs of other
states in order to bring about peaceful and prosperous institutions that would thereby be more
conducive to the creation of a peaceful and prosperous world. The United States would be the
greatest beneficiary of this new world and thus had a vested interest in ensuring its inception.
The Truman Doctrine was just one example of an overarching grand strategy for the creation of a
new world order. This study will rely on his analysis of the economics of American foreign
policy in understanding Van Fleet's role in the implementation of the Truman Doctrine.
One of the most detailed studies of the Truman Doctrine and its implementation in the
Greek Civil War is Howard Jones' A New Kind of War published in 1989. Jones' thesis is that
the Truman Doctrine represented a new approach to conducting American foreign policy in
which the United States committed itself broadly to a new grand strategy of containment while
crafting its individual policies to according to specific problems. This "new kind of war" would
be both flexible and restrained. It would establish a broad and flexible policy to halt Soviet
expansion while confining itself to specific achievable objectives. Though the most
sophisticated and detailed of any work on the subject, Jones did not have the benefit of being
able to make use of the Van Fleet and Stephens papers, which this study will utilize.
A work that loosely falls into the revisionist camp is Lawrence Wittner's American
Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949 published in 1981. Wittner examines in detail how despite
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the Truman administration's commitment to preserving democracy and liberal values, it allied
itself with some of the most anti-democratic forces in Greece. Wittner demonstrates how
American personnel in Greece forged a strong working relationship with the hard right-wing of
the Greek government and actively undermined Greek sovereignty and the civil liberties of its
citizens. Wittner's analysis is significantly more sophisticated than many of the other revisionist
scholars in that he does not forgive the violence and atrocities of the Greek guerrilla forces.
Despite the nuanced view ofWittner's study, Van Fleet is treated as a generally minor player in
this work.
Bruce Kuniholm, in his 1980 The Origins ofthe Cold War in the Near East, provides a
post-revisionist account of the origins of the Cold War in the Northern Tier states of Iran,
Turkey, and Greece. By framing the Cold War in the Near East as an extension ofthe century
old great power conflict between Great Britain and Russia for influence in the Balkan States,
Kuniholm offers an impressive study of the regional impact of the Truman Doctrine and its aid
program. This study will rely on this work primarily for the author's insights into the great
power's conflict in the Northern Tier and its impact on the social and political tensions in
Greece.
Another impressive study from the revisionist point of view is Yiannis Roubatis' 1989
Tangled Webs: The US. in Greece, 1947-1949. This study emphasizes the role ofthe United
States in undermining Greek national sovereignty from the beginning of the Civil War through
"the Junta" of 1967. Though it offers an interesting look at internal political dynamics of
American-Greek relations, Roubatis deemphasizes the role of Van Fleet and his colleagues in
Greece in order to emphasis the United States' Cold War strategy towards Greece.
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One ofthe most recent studies of the Greek aid program is offered by Judith Jeffries in
her Ambiguous Commitments and Uncertain Policies. Jeffries is a critic ofthe Truman Doctrine,
though unlike Roubatis, she asserts that the Truman Doctrine was conceived as primarily an
economic policy and that the shift towards military aid was never originally intended. Relying
extensively on Jones, Wittner, and the FRUS series, she overlooks important sources relating to
the implementation ofthe program on the ground and its early military orientation. Specifically,
she made little use ofthe Van Fleet and Stephens papers that offer substantial insights into the
events in Greece and the primary role that military aid played very early on. Her emphasis on
the economics ofthe Truman Doctrine prevents her from noting the significant military element
ofthe policy formulated as early as March 1947.
Prelude: Origins of the Greek Civil War
The Greek Civil War emerged from a long standing conflict between the left and right of
Greek politics. Scholars divide the civil war into three phases. The first occurred toward the end
of World War II, and it emerged from a decades-old struggle between the left and right. Though
for reasons to be explored later, these political classifications are not entirely adequate. During
World War II, Greece successfully countered the Italian invasion oflate 1940 but quickly came
under the control ofthe German forces when they invaded later in 1941. The German
occupation ofGreece lasted from April 1941 to the fall of 1944. During this time a loose-knit
coalition ofpolitical resistance groups emerged that included the Communist Party ofGreece
(KKE) and the right-wing National Republican Greek League (EDES). Though not directly
affiliated with the Soviet Union, many, including the Ambassador to Greece Lincoln MacVeagh,
believed that the KKE would inevitably fall under the influence ofStalin. The KKE developed
into a popular movement called the National Liberation Front (EAM) and its military arm, the
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People's Liberation Army (ELAS). The EDES independently pursued its own objectives but
gradually it came into an uneasy alliance with the EAM-ELAS. This arrangement lasted until
mid-1943 when the resistance coalition broke down over mutual suspicion regarding
collaboration with the Nazi occupation. Armed conflict broke out soon after and the fighting
lasted until May 1944 when both sides attended the Lebanon Conference. The terms of the
agreement reached there was that both factions would become a part of the newly established
national unity government. This agreement brought an end to the first phase of the conflict.4
Following the liberation of Greece by the British in October 1944, Greece continued to
be plagued by political and economic problems. While the new government under the
premiership of George Papandreou solidified control in Athens, the EAM-ELAS guerrillas still
controlled most of the countryside. The second round of fighting broke out in December 1944
when the government and the Athenian-based ELAS members clashed. The British commander
was ordered to deal with the rebellion and the ELAS fled the city and moved north. Fighting
continued until the end of January and the second phase of the conflict was concluded with the
Treaty of Varkiza in February 194 5. 5 The conditions of this agreement required the repeal of all
laws that restricted freedom of speech, granted amnesty to all participants in the round two
fighting, repealed martial law, created a national army, demobilized the guerrilla resistance
forces, and planned a plebiscite on the return of the monarchy.6 Plans for a general
parliamentary election were scheduled for the following year.

4

Yiannis P. Roubatis, Tangled Webs: The U.S. in Greece 1947-1967, (New York: Pella Publishing Company, Inc,
1987), 13-16.

5

For a more detailed discussion of the second round see John 0. Iatrides, Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist
"Second Round" 1944-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

6

Roubatis, 17-18.
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American policy towards Greece during this time was characterized by casual disinterest.
President Franklin Roosevelt and the United States expressed little concern for the Balkan states
as long as the Anglo-Russian rivalries over the region did not undermine the allied war efforts.
Great Britain had a historical concern for the stability of the region as it ensured a safe line of
communications to its colonial assets in India. In addition, during the war, the British Special
Operations Executive (SOE) assumed primary responsibility for intelligence operations and
coordination with the resistance groups in Greece. 7 Preoccupation with the Polish question and
the United States' traditional policy of non-interference in Greek affairs precluded Roosevelt
from taking any definitive position on the issue as the first and second rounds of the Greek Civil
War were developing. When the third phase broke out toward the end of 1946, Harry Truman
had succeeded Roosevelt'in the White House and had already begun changing the tone of U.S.
foreign policy. Though Roosevelt had assumed this disinterested posture towards Greece, others
in the government, particularly Loy Henderson of the State's Department's Near Eastern Affairs
Division and the long time U.S. Ambassador to Greece Lincoln MacVeagh, believed that
Greece, along with Turkey, would become very important to U.S. interests in the post-World
War II era. It was largely a result of Loy Henderson's efforts that the Truman Administration
changed its position towards Greece and decided to expand its role in securing stability in the
broader Near East. 8 Well into 1946, the Truman Administration believed that Greece was
fundamentally a British problem.

Judith S. Jeffery, Ambiguous Commitments and Uncertain Policies: The Truman Doctrine in Greece, 1947-1952
(New York: Lexington Books, 2000), 4-5.

7

For Henderson's efforts to convince Roosevelt of the importance of Greece and the Near East and his greater
success under Truman see Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East. Great Power Conflict
and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
8
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The election of March 1946 resulted in a large victory for the Populist Party of
Constantine Tsaldaris. The KKE had boycotted the elections over issues relating to disarmament
of the EAM/ELAS and concerns for the safety of former ELAS members who had been
persecuted during the "White Terror" that Papandreou and his allies had instigated following the
Varkiza Agreement. 9 The election results were widely criticized, and the KKE leaders
responded by organizing their own military force. The leader of the KKE was Nikos
Zachariadis. A notoriously pro-Stalin partisan, he had been arrested and imprisoned in Dachau
during WWII. He reassumed command of the KKE when he returned to Greece and following
the election results, moved to organize a guerrilla force capable of fighting the Greek Army. The
KKE appointed the legendary guerrilla fighter Markos Vaphiades to create and organize the
remnants of the ELAS into a new army. 10 By October 1946, "General Markos" had reorganized
the ELAS into the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG). Many in the west believed that Joseph
Stalin was behind these efforts though this would later turn out to be incorrect. The tactics
employed by the DAG during this time included kidnappings, assassinations, and sabotage.
During this period there were over 700 different armed clashes between the DAG forces and the
Greek National Army (GNA). The guerrilla force reached a maximum strength of twenty
thousand with an additional eight to fifteen thousand being trained in Albania, Bulgaria, and
Yugoslavia. 11 These three countries provided substantial amounts of aid to the "bandits" as they
came to be called. In response to this, the Greek Government went to the United Nations

9

Ibid., 250-255.

10

Howard Jones, A New Kind of War: America's Global Strategy and The Truman Doctrine in Greece (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989, 20-21. Also, Zachary Karabell, Architects ofIntervention: The United States, the
Third World, and the Cold War, 1946-1962 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 20-21.
11

Paul Braim, The Will to Win: The Life of General James Van Fleet, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 158160.
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Security Council on 3 December 1946. Soon after the council approved the creation of an
investigative committee to go to Greece and study the issue. 12
A plebiscite in September 1946 returned King George to Greece by a margin of two to
one and this only furthered mutual hostilities between the government and guerrillas. Guerrilla
activity intensified over the next few weeks as they positioned themselves in the northern regions
of Grammos and Vitsi, nestled in the mountains near the borders of Albania and Bulgaria. By
the end of 1946 Greece was on the verge of disaster. Its continuing economic deterioration, the
inability of the Greek Army to respond adequately to the guerrilla threats, and the upcoming
revelation that Great Britain would soon be withdrawing its support meant that the third phase of
the Greek Civil War was about to begin.
Truman Doctrine: The Aid Program and its Limitations, March 1947-January 1948
On February 21, 1947, the British informed the U.S. State Department that it would be
ending its support and withdrawing its forces from Greece. Great Britain was suffering from
economic problems stemming from World War II and it was no longer in a position to prop up
the government in Athens. Tsaldaris was forced to resign as prime minister under increasing
pressure from the British. Dimitrios Maximos assumed the premiership with Tsaldaris as his
deputy and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Truman Administration by this point had
committed itself to supporting the Greek government in order to hold off what was believed to be
a Soviet-backed partisan insurrection. On 27 February, Truman met with Secretary of State
George Marshall, Under-Secretary Dean Acheson, and the leading members of the Congress to
convince them of the necessity of a legislative aid program for Greece and nearby Turkey. 13
Though Secretary Marshall was expected to take the lead in making the case for Greece, he
12

Kuniholm, 400-404.

13

This study does not examine the Turkey issue but a detailed analysis can be found in Kuniholm, 255-270.
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"flubbed his operung" and his acting Acheson soon took control of the meeting. Acheson
described the situation in Greece in apocalyptic terms. Acheson in his memoirs wrote that "Like
apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to
the east. It would carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe
through Italy and France. " 14
Though he despised "crisis diplomacy," the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Arthur Vandenberg agreed with Acheson's basic understanding of the situation.
American foreign policy by this time was heavily influenced by the ideas of the head of the State
Department's newly created Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan. His views were best
exemplified in his Long Telegram and in his "Sources of Soviet Conflict" or "X'' article
published in Foreign, Affairs the previous year. The conventional wisdom was that the Soviet
Union desired expansion. Policymakers believed that Stalin was actively supporting the
activities of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia in Greece in furtherance of this expansionist
policy. They did not know whether this expansion was for conquest or security, but Kennan
argued that U.S. policy should maintain a "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment
of Russian expansive tendencies" no matter what their form. 15 This idea of containment formed
the foundation of U.S. foreign policy for the next half century and was embraced by many across
the political spectrum. Indeed, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican, noted that the
problem in Greece "cannot be isolated by itself On the contrary, it is probably symbolic of the
world-wide ideological clash between Eastern Communism and Western Democracy." 16 From
Quoted in Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company Inc., 1969), 219.
14

15

Ibid.

Quoted in Arthur Vandenberg Jr. ed., The Private Papers a/Senator Vandenberg, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1952), 340.
16

14
the point of view of the U.S., the situation in Greece was more than just a civil war, it was an
ideological conflict with global implications.
Vandenberg assured Truman and Acheson of bis commitment to an aid program for
Greece and Turkey but requested that "Mr. President, if you will say that to the Congress and the
country, I will support you and I believe that most of its members will do the same." 17 President
Truman delivered such a message several weeks later on March 12 to a joint session of
Congress. In bis speech President Truman framed the issue in Manichean terms. He said that
the world "must choose between alternative ways of life ... One way of life is based upon the will
of the majority," the other upon, "the will of the minority forcibly imposed upon the majority."
This was a grand statement of principles and of the international responsibilities of the United
States. With the theory pronounced, the Truman Doctrine now had to be put into practice and
the first testing ground was Greece.
On May 22, 1947, Public Law 75 or the "Truman Doctrine" was passed by a vote of 6723 in the Senate and 287-107 in the House of Representatives. This law established the
American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG). This new organization was headed by civilian
authorities who would work in conjunction with the U.S. EIUbassy, as well as with the military
arm of the aid mission, the United States Army Group Greece (USAGG). Dwight Griswold, a
former Republican governor of Nebraska, was appointed the director of the aid program.
Though the U.S. Ambassador MacVeagh was theoretically the point person for coordinating all
U.S. activities in Greece, Griswold assumed tactical control over the aid program. General
William Livesay was appointed the commander of USAGG. His responsibilities were confined
to advising the Greek Army on the use of equipment provided to them through the aid program,

17

Vandenberg quoted in Acheson, 219.
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and his role in policy formulation was strictly limited. 18 The U.S. operations in Greece were
headquartered at the Grand Bretagne Hotel in Athens.
In July 1947 Dwight Griswold arrived in Athens. Almost immediately there was conflict
between him and Ambassador MacVeagh. 19 A major source of contention was over efforts by
the United States and Great Britain to create a more "broad based" government in Greece. The
general consensus was that a coalition between the Liberal Party of Themistocles Sofoulis and
the Populists of Constantine Tsaldaris would be the best possible arrangement. The major
disagreement between Griswold and MacVeagh stemmed not from the substance of such a
policy but the methods by which to attain it. Both men exhibited very different political styles.
Griswold was gruff and direct and maintained no reservations at all about openly intervening in
the affairs of Greek politics. In October 194 7, he wrote, "it would be wrong for the AMAG or
for the United States Government to attempt to represent to world opinion that AMAG does not
have great powers or that it is not involved in Greek Internal affairs. "20 MacVeagh, on the other
hand, was a professional diplomat who had immersed himself in Greek society for nearly a
decade and had hoped to influence Greek policy through indirect pressures. MacVeagh said in
July 1947 that, "I believe our policy of careful non-interference in Greek internal affairs to be
one of our strongest assets with the Greek people. "21
One of Van Fleet's significant accomplishments later during his tenure was in his
synthesis of these two competing views. Van Fleet created an effective interventionist policy

18

Jones, 50-61.

19

This feud between Griswold and MacVeagh has been well documented. See Jones, 72-73. Roubatis, 38-44.
Lawrence Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949, (New York, Columbia University Press, I 982),
117-119.
20 Griswold quoted in Roubatis, 53.
21

MacVeagh quoted in Karabell, 31.
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cloaked in non-interventionist rhetoric that satisfied the Greeks' pride. Ultimately, Griswold's
approach came to dominate U.S. policy towards Greece. In late July, the pressure he applied led
to Sofoulis and Tsaldaris to begin talking about the formation of a broad based coalition
government. 22 Sofoulis maintained that, "it was not a question of who the personalities of the
new government would be, but rather a matter of making it felt ... that a radical change had come
over Greece's policy."23 Though this meeting did not immediately produce results, it planted the
seeds for a future collaboration.
On September 5, Loy Henderson met with Sofoulis and explained to him American
concerns about the participation of left-wing parties in a possible coalition. Henderson implied
strongly that any such participation could endanger the American aid program. Sofoulis
understood the implication and agreed to exclude the left from his coalition. This effectively
ended any potential for a political settlement between the KKE and the Greek government.
During this meeting, Sofoulis also expressed concern over the ideological orientation of the
major military governing body the Greek General Staff (GGS). Several of its members were
known to be fervent anti-communists who had participated in the "white terror" of the previous
government and had been involved in some of the most extreme right-wing violence of the
period. Sofoulis hoped to remove many of its members but had met with opposition from
Tsaldaris. Although Henderson shared Sofoulis' concerns, no decision was made regarding
replacing these officials. This makeup of GGS was an issue that plagued American policy
makers well into the next year.
On September 7 1947 Sofoulis and Tsaldaris formed a liberal-populist coalition
government. Rumors immediately began circulating about a possible deal between these two on
22 Ibid., 37-38.
23 Sofoulis quoted in Wittner, 112.

17
future changes in the partisan makeup of the GGS. The following day, General Livesay and his
British counterpart General Stuart Rawlins met to discuss the Anglo-American position on the
issue. The decision reached at that meeting was that the Greek government was not to undertake
any major changes in the makeup of the GGS without consulting the Anglo-American military
leaders.24 Again, the aid program was used as leverage to force Sofoulis' hand on the matter.
By mid-October the problem remerged when Sofoulis wanted to fire the hard-lined royalist head
of the GGS General Constantine Ventiris. Ventiris was widely believed to have been involved in
the "white terror" and had connections to the secret extremist organization "X." The American
and British military missions shared Sofoulis' concerns about Ventiris' activities. Sofoulis
agreed to defer to a list of replacements offered by Livesay and Rawlins. On October 15 Ventiris
was sacked and was replaced with General Dimitrios Yiantzis. This decision was not entirely
pleasing to Sofoulis; however, as Yiantzis had been another general on his list of GGS staff
members who Sofoulis had wanted to see go. 25
Some scholars have noted that decisions like this were evidence that the Greek nation had
essentially ceased to be a sovereign state by this point.26 This view, however, fails to take into
consideration the fact that the United States' sole method of applying pressure at this point was
in threatening to remove the aid program. It is unlikely that the U.S. would have withdrawn aid
at this point, particularly in light of the announcement of the Marshall Plan earlier in June 194 7.
The U.S. was committed to intervening in Greece and it is unlikely that the threat of "pulling
out" would have carried with it the sort of political weight necessary to undermine the Greek
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Government. This is especially true given the significant role of Tsaldaris in the formulation of
government policy during this time.27
In September 1947 conditions in Greece were deteriorating rapidly. The DAG was
continuing its raiding activities and the GNA was proving incapable of meeting the challenge.
The GNA was plagued with numerous problems including poor leadership, diminished morale,
and a lack of aggressiveness. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to dispatch Major-General
Stephen J. Chamberlain to assess the military situation and to provide recommendations on
future U.S. policy in Greece. His findings reflected the general mood about the USAAG and the
limitations of its mission. As the mission was confined to providing training, it was not able to
go into the field nor was it able to have any significant impact on the functioning and
effectiveness of the Greek National Army. Livesay was a talented logistics officer but was
unable to wield any substantive influence over the GNA and its field operations against the
DAG.28 Some of his accomplishments during this time, though, included expanding the GNA to
132,000, increasing U.S. military assistance from $150 million to $171 million, and helping to
create a National Defense Corps of 50,000 civilians who would assume the responsibilities of the
gendarmerie and the garrisoning of Greek towns so that the GNA was free to pursue operations
against the guerrillas.29
In addition to the problems plaguing the USAGG, there was continuing conflict between
Griswold and Mac Veagh. By November 1947, their working relationship had deteriorated to the
point where President Truman was forced to issue a new directive that clearly delineated the
authority of the aid program. Under this new directive, the aid program fell completely under the
27
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Ambassador to Greece Mac Veagh. Griswold responded to this new policy by threatening to
resign. President Truman was concerned with keeping Griswold on board as his involvement
was seen as essential to maintaining the bipartisan foreign policy established between Truman
and Senator Vandenberg. MacVeagh, on the other hand, was a skilled long time diplomat who
understood the Greeks as they understood themselves and continued to promote non-intervention
in their internal affairs. Truman weighed the political benefits of keeping MacVeagh over
Griswold but ultimately endorsed the Griswold approach to implementing the aid program.
Truman fired Lincoln MacVeagh on November 19, 1947. 30
Following Chamberlain's study of the situation, the general consensus in Washington
was that a new approach was necessary in Greece. It was decided that a new military
organization needed to be created that would be able to more actively involve itself in the affairs
of the GNA. To that end, on December 12, 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Joint U.S.
Military Advisory Planning Group, Greece (JUSMAPG). This new organization would be under
civilian control in Greece but would maintain direct communications with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. 31 This group was temporarily under the command of Livesay, but because of his "lack of
progress" in Greece, it was expected that he would soon be replaced. Shortly after the
announcement of JUSMAPG on December 23, "General Markos" declared the First Provisional
Democratic Government of Free Greece. The following day, he launched an attack on town of
Konitsa but was forced to abandon these plans by early January 194$. 32 Shortly after on
December 28, the KKE was outlawed by the Greek government. By the end of 1947, the DAG
had firmly established themselves in the Grammos and Vitsi areas and the GNA were unable to
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remove them. The United States and Greek governments believed that the rebels commanded
the loyalties or sympathies of nearly 150,000 Greeks.33 It was decided during this time that if
economic and political stability was to be restored then there had to be a military victory over the
guerrillas. Secretary Marshall stated during this time that if the Greek military aid program was
to be successful, then a new and more "impressive personality" was needed in Greece. 34 He
found that new personality in Major General James Van Fleet
Van Fleet in Greece: Politics and Diplomacy 1948
While Greece was being ravaged by civil war and American policy makers were
weighing the decision to intervene, General Van Fleet was stationed in Frankfurt, Germany, at
the European Command as Chief of Operations, Planning, Organizations, and Training. Van
Fleet was appointed Chief of the U.S. Army Group, American Mission to Greece (USAGAMG)
and Director of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Planning Group, Greece (JUSMAPG) on 6
February 1948. The reasons for his appointment were fairly obvious. During World War II, Van
Fleet demonstrated his leadership abilities time after time and was known for being an
exceptionally aggressive commander. Later in 1948 a young officer named Vickers wrote to
General Livesay and noted that Van Fleet ''talks like a football coach between halves."35 This
was a very different style than Livesay who was a logistics officer and had very little combat
experience. Secretary Marshall decided that Van Fleet was the most appropriate figure to take
on the role in Greece.
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In early February 1948, Van Fleet was called back to Washington D.C. to be briefed by
Marshall on his new assignment in Greece. During that meeting, Marshall advised Van Fleet to
seek out the aid and counsel of King Paul and Queen Fredericka of Greece. Marshall recognized
that one of the problems that plagued the early aid program was the poor working relationships
between both the American military and civilian missions but also between the Americans and
the Greek government. Marshall suggested that once a relationship was established they should
travel with Van Fleet around Greece to visit the frontlines and that in addition to improving
morale and fighting ability, that it could be politically advantageous. Van Fleet returned to
Germany to coordinate in own personal affairs and then left for London where he met with the
British Chiefs of Staff Van Fleet characterized this meeting as merely an attempt by the British
military establishment to "look him over" and determine what sort of threat he would be to their
interests in Greece.36
At this meeting Van Fleet discussed with the Chiefs of Staff the major issues and goals of
Anglo-American policy in Greece. The British Chief of the Air Force Lord Tedder and Van
Fleet both believed that one of the most important goals of the military aid mission was to
reorganize the Greek military in such a way as to avoid the sort of political interference that had
been characteristic of the government in Athens. Van Fleet maintained that, "The main problem
was to prevent tactical direction from Athens, as had occurred in the past. A big proportion of
the Greek Army was at present occupied in defending towns and other areas for political reasons
and were not used for strictly military objectives." Van Fleet believed that the Greek Army was
already prepared to undertake independent operations but that an overall operational plan was
necessary and the Greek government could prove to be a greater hindrance to its success than the
DAG guerrillas. Another problem was the need to properly coordinate land and air forces. This
36
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required a centralized coordinating effort based in Athens that could act independently of
political forces. It was unlikely that the Greeks could establish that sort of organizational
structure given the political and military constraints.37 The bureaucratic aid situation in Greece
was also highly complex. The British Military Mission (HMM) had five separate entities that
acted independently and each of their efforts had to be coordinated within the general framework
established by the new American aid mission JUSMAPG. 38
These problems were magnified by the general British attitude toward their historical role
in Greece. British public opinion was strongly in favor of reducing troops in Greece. Lord
Tedder suggested that such criticism could be alleviated if the U.S. was willing to send a "small
token force" to Greece as had been suggested by Secretary Marshall. Van Fleet was skeptical of
sending additional forces other than those already present in the aid mission. He believed that
the U.S. fleet and marines already positioned in the Mediterranean were a sufficient "stabilizing
factor." The general view was that the primary concern for the U.S. should be the economic
recovery of Greece and that it could only be achieved if law and order was reestablished.39 It
was also agreed that the Greeks had to be responsible for defeating the guerrillas. If either the
U.S. or Great Britain were forced to take that responsibility then it would have publicly
undermined the political legitimacy of the Greek state. Sending combat troops into Greece was
therefore an untenable solution. Though the British ultimately maintained forces in Greece into
1952, the U.S. military mission assumed primary responsibility for overseeing the GNA.
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The main challenge for Van Fleet and his British counterparts was that they had to craft
their policies in such a way as to pressure the government in Athens without undermining it.
This was made all the more difficult by the general lack of credibility of the Sofoulis
government. If the British and Americans were unable to accomplish this goal by the end of
1948, Lord Tedder believed that further "diplomatic pressure" would be needed. 40 The need to
preserve Greek stability required ensuring the creation of a more efficient armed force. To
establish this, however, it was necessary to undermine the Greek government privately without it
losing even more public credibility. This became the dominant theme in American involvement
in Greece over the next two years and Van Fleet was its chief advocate and practitioner.
At this point it is necessary to address an issue that is of considerable significance to
scholars of the Truman Doctrine. In February 1948, as Van Fleet arrived in Greece, some
scholars might argue that the Greek element of the Truman Doctrine had achieved its purpose.
This is true in so far as one defines the purpose of the Truman Doctrine as the prevention of
Soviet expansion into Greece. As Van Fleet was preparing to leave for Greece, Stalin met in
Moscow with ambassadors from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to discuss various issues relating to
Balkan affairs. Stalin told these representatives that, "one should assist Greece [i.e. guerrillas] if
there are hopes of winning, and if not, then we should rethink and terminate the guerrilla
movement. The Anglo-Americans will spare no effort to keep Greece [in their sphereJ."41 This
statement is found both in Albanian minutes of the meeting as well as in the memoirs of the
Yugoslavian diplomat Milovan Djilas. Stalin's concern over Anglo-American involvement was
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linked to his greater concern for other issues impacting the states already in his sphere of
influence. Engaging in a protracted fight over the political alignment of a state he had already
acknowledged fell under British authority seemed to him to be a losing battle. This was
especially true given the strong commitment by the U.S. and Great Britain to defend the
territorial integrity of Greece. During this meeting he added, "The uprising in Greece must be ·
stopped, and as quickly as possible."42 This is not to say that Stalin did not express interest in
the affairs of Greece but rather that it was not as politically significant as other areas of eastern
Europe.
These statements would not be known to policy makers and scholars in the west for years
to come. From the point of view of those in the west, Stalin was still very much involved in the
destabilization of the Greek state and he desired to expand his influence there. This gradual
reduction of Soviet interest in Greek affairs does not undermine the importance of the subsequent
events in Greece. Though the Truman Doctrine was essentially a success at this point, the war
was still raging throughout the country and there was still significant concern for U.S. and
British authorities. According to a memo dated March 13, 1948 from one of Van Fleet's
subordinate officers, Lieutenant Merrill, problems persisted in Greece. Apart from the
continuing presence of civil and military strife across the nation, Greek civil servants had gone
on strike over the government's inability to pay their salaries; thousands of Greek children had
gone missing; and evidence continued to pour in about the involvement of Greece's neighbors in
the insurrection.43 If Greece fell to an independent communist political force, it was unknown
what their allegiances might be. The position of the U.S. during this period can best be
illustrated with the following statement made by a U.S. representative at the U.N. Speaking on
42
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issues relating to the Greek border crisis with Albania, the representative said that the overall
policy ofthe Soviet Union and its satellite countries was "the establishment in Greece ofa
minority totalitarian government which would be subservient to the Communist-controlled
countries."44 From the point ofview of the U.S. and Great Britain subsequent involvement in
Greece was still necessary.
Following the London meeting, Van Fleet arrived in Athens on February 24. He quickly
acquainted himselfwith the local players and offices. The general's meeting with Prime
Minister Sofoulis proved to be quite interesting. There he was informed by Sofoulis that because
ofthe nature ofthe "Greek character," Van Fleet should avoid telling Greek officials what his
intentions were. 45 Ifhe failed to do this then the enemy would know the details oftheir
operations before the GNA was able to put them into effect. Van Fleet acknowledged this reality
early on, and secrecy and subtlety became defining themes ofhis time as head ofJUSMP AG.
Soon after this meeting Van Fleet assumed a place on the Supreme National Defense Council
(SNDC), which governed military affairs and was comprised ofthirty-six members from the
Greek cabinet and parliament. There Van Fleet began maneuvering himselfthrough the political
thicket as the soldier-statesmen. What made Van Fleet such an effective diplomatic-warrior was
his subtle approach to problem solving. A BBC Radio Script from early 1948 said ofVan Fleet
that he "thinks twice before he says anything, and then used the fewest words possible. He
doesn't deal in subtleties or abstractions."46
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One of Van Fleet's first achievements in Greece was the restructuring of the Greek
National Army. In early 1948 he convinced the SNDC to cede authority over military decision
making to the head of the Greek General Staff General Yiantzis. Van Fleet sought to create an
independent military executive who would be able to operate freely without political
interference. 1broughout Van Fleet's tenure in Greece, he maintained that "The political
situation in Greece .. .is having a detrimental effect up on the army." 47 To pursue this objective,
Van Fleet did not employ subtle threats or bold press statements, as were the chosen tactics of
MacVeagh and Griswold, but instead he appealed to the King Paul I through his wife Queen
Fredericka. Van Fleet made contact early on with the Greek royal family through a personal
letter of introduction by Secretary Marshall. In that note Marshall informed Queen Fredericka
that Van Fleet was the "most aggressive and hard-driving Army Corps Commander" and that he
hoped that, "behind the scenes your personal interest in Van Fleet may be helpful."48 Shortly
after arriving in Greece, Van Fleet was invited to attend a reception at the home of the royal
family. There he had a private audience with Queen Fredericka where the two discussed the
crisis in Greece and she assured him that if he had any problems with the Greek government or
army that should bring them to her attentio_n. Van Fleet was grateful and just as Marshall had
told him in Washington he asked if she and the King would be willing to travel with him to the
front lines in the hopes of increasing troop morale. She agreed and the two solidified a bond that
would be enormously beneficial to Van Fleet in the months to come. Through her influence, he
was able to secure her husband's support for the general's proposals to reform the command
structure of the Greek General Staff. With King Paul's intervention, the SNDC approved Van
Fleet's plan to place sole executive decision making authority in the Chief of Staff of the GGS.
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The head of the GGS was now able to z.ct independently of the SNDC and the Greek PacE3IDent
and was free to pursue the war without political interference. 49
Once the Chief of Staff had achieved independent decision making authority, Van Fleet
turned his attention to the senior officers of the GNA. He identified several of them who he
believed were too old, ineffective, or unaggressive. At a meeting of the SNDC in March, it was
decided, on Van Fleet's recommendation, to retire all of the Lt. Generals of the GNA.
Replacements for those men were selected within a few hours and the new policy went into
effect within four days. This decision was met with some resistance by the military leadership
who actively attempted to use their political connections to save their jobs. Letters poured in
from relatives and friends of the terminated generals and Van Fleet courteously rejected all of
their pleas. 50 Prime Minister Sofoulis, Deputy and Foreign Minister Tsaldaris, and King Paul all
supported Van Fleet's decision and there was no interference from the SNDC.
His significant involvement and success in influencing internal political affairs has led
some such as Roubatis to conclude that Van Fleet exercised virtual control over the entire Greek
National Army. It is said that during meetings of the SNDC, there was a general but unspoken
consensus that all decisions had to be approved by Van Fleet. One person noted that they would,
"observe his expressions so that they would agree on each and every issue with the 'yes' or the
'no' that he would pronounce deliberately and without a smile."51 This is important as it is
indicative of the myth that surrounds Van Fleet's time in Greece. This myth depicts Van Fleet as
a viceroy figure who could orchestrate the rise and fall of governments. This absolute power
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seems farfetched when one examines the actual arrangement in Greece. There can be no doubt
that all of the American advisors in Greece wielded considerable influence over the decision
making process but to suggest that they could veto proposals by shaking their head fails to
appreciate the independent judgment and authority that many in the Greek political and military
establishment wielded.
During Van Fleet's time in Greece he was forced to navigate political and diplomatic
waters that he had never before had to experience. Press conferences became a regular part of
his schedule as well as conferences and high level meetings with members of the Greek
government. Van Fleet successfully adapted him to this new environment and learned how to
use the media to his advantage. He was careful to never publicly criticize the Greek army or
government but did so in such a way to make the public fully aware of the value of Anglo
American military and economic assistance. He communicated his message not through
sophistry but by applying a certain passive honesty. This approach stands in direct contrast to
Griswold's method, who never failed to publicly blame the Greek army when he thought it could
embarrass the government into action. 52 Griswold though never realized the direct impact such
statements had on the morale of the GNA. Van Fleet's methods were also different from Gen.
Livesay who frequently criticized the Greek government for interfering in military affairs.
Livesay said in an interview with the Greek newspaper Eleftheria that, "It [American policy] was
not successful in that we did not carry out all we had promised but our aim was to stop
Communism and in this respect American policy was successful." These comments contradict
the stated objectives of the entire American military and civilian aid mission which was to

52

See Memo to the Commander General, Van Fleet Correspondence, Box 49, Folder 15 in which Griswold blamed
the Greek army's previous lack of aggression for the continuing presence of the bandits.

29
strengthen the legitimacy ofthe Greek government and bolster Greek anny morale so that it
could more effectively combat the insurgency which had grown to 27,000 fighters. 53
Despite Van Fleet's diplomatic talents in maneuvering in front ofthe press, he knew
when being honest and direct could be effective. When asked by Eleftheria ifvictory over the
Greek bandits was more a matter ofsystem than anns, Van Fleet replied, "There is only one
method: either capture or kill them."54 Van Fleet understood the nature ofjournalism better than
he probably realized. He applied blunt and direct humor when it was appropriate and when it
was most likely going to have the greatest effect. After only a few months in Greece, the DAG
guerrillas attempted to assassinate Van Fleet by placing dynamite charges along a railroad track
that he was traveling on while inspecting the frontlines. After this was made public, a journalist
asked Van Fleet ifhe intended on traveling by train anymore. Van Fleet responded, "We will
take any train, anytime, and go back there." 55 This tenacity certainly proved to be a motivating
force for the GNA whose members were growing tired ofcontinuing the conflict against the
DAG.
Van Fleet's diplomatic talents can be further illustrated by examining his relationship
with the civilian directors ofthe aid missions. When Van Fleet arrived in Greece in February,
Griswold was still the head ofAMAG. Their relationship proved to be little different than the
one that had existed between Griswold and MacVeagh. Griswold did not appreciate Van Fleet's
more subtle tactics and was convinced that Van Fleet had little understanding ofthe political and
economic issues facing Greece. 56 Before Griswold left later that year, he suggested to Truman
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that he replace Van Fleet. Griswold wrote to Truman saying that Van Fleet did "not have an
interest in or an understanding of the financial and political problems in Greece."57 Nothing
came of his request but it does illustrate some of the early conflicts between the civilian and
military branches of the Truman Doctrine aid program
Van Fleets relationship with Griswold's successor, Ambassador Henry F. Grady, was far
worse than anything he had experienced with Griswold. In early 1948, Griswold resigned his
position as head of AMAG and Henry Grady, then Ambassador to India, was appointed to take
his place both as Ambassador to Greece and as director of AMAG. This was done to correct the
errors that plagued the early aid program and had led to the vitriolic bureaucratic infighting
between Griswold and MacVeagh. Grady was selected for the job because of his ambassadorial
experience but also because he had served as an advisor during the March elections in 1946 and
was intimately familiar with the Greek situation. 58 Grady arrived in Greece in July 1948 and
there was immediate tension between him and Van Fleet. Later that year, Van Fleet received a
memorandum from Grady accusing him of having stolen his parking place in front of the Grand
Bretagne Hotel and coveting his personal aircraft. This particular piece of correspondence
illustrates the petty bureaucratic squabbling that Ambassador Grady descended to in his position
as Ambassador to Greece and Director of AMAG. Van Fleet cordially responded to this letter
downplaying the ridiculousness of the message and reassured his commitment to working with
Grady all the while feigning a deferential respect to him. 59 This did not prevent Grady from
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submitting further complaints to the State Department and to President Truman. In response to
Grady's accusations, Truman sent the Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall to assess the
situation in Greece. Royall's visit in late 1948 was made without Grady's lrn.owledge and upon
arriving was met by Van Fleet who took him directly to meet with King Paul and Queen
Fredericka. During that meeting, both the King and Queen reaffirmed their faith in Van Fleet's
talents and abilities. Royall later told Truman, "Just leave Van Fleet alone, and- ambassador or

°

no ambassador - he'll win this war."6 From this point on, Truman made no further inquiries
into Van Fleet's qualifications or working relationships.
Throughout his time in Greece, Van Fleet maintained that the Greek Civil War was not a
civil war. Van Fleet argued that the conflict in Greece was a "struggle for International
Communists against the lawfully elected and established Government of an independent state. "61
Van Fleet believed that given the international character of the conflict and the enormous amount
of assistance provided by foreign entities precluded the struggle from qualifying as a civil war.
Years later, Van Fleet compared the Greek situation to that of Korea and Vietnam and noted that
it ''took years of planning, infiltration, training and building the framework within the country of
propaganda, recruitment, intelligence, and logistics."62 Tbis is not entirely correct in that the
guerrilla movement developed alongside the Greek government that emerged out of World War
IL It is important to note that the specter of international communism had become ingrained in
many military and political leaders' minds, and this had the effect of intensifying policies beyond
what an otherwise non-global conflict might have entailed. Van Fleet was no exception to this
and his view that the conflict did not constitute a civil war enabled him to support severe
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measures against the guerrillas and their supporters on the grounds that they were no longer
legitimate citizens ofGreece. He later said in 1949 that "There can be no agreement between the
Greek Nation and the leaders ofthe banditry. For them the question is posed: Death or
unconditional surrender."63 For Van Fleet, the bandits were� entity independent of the Greek
Nation and as such they were in no position to expect anything from the government except the
application offorce.
By early April of 1948 with the reform of the GNA command structure in place, Van
Fleet decided that it was time for the army to move against the rebels. Van Fleet believed that
the time had come to pursue a small victory for the GNA and the government. In what would
become known as "Operation Dawn" the GNA attacked a stronghold of2000-3000 rebels in the
Roumeli area ofcentral Greece. The operation was intended to accomplish several things. One
of those was to boost the morale of the GNA. Van Fleet believed that the Greek forces were
generally capable but that they had become disillusioned with the lack ofprogress in their
conflict with the DAG. Another objective ofthis operation was to help strengthen the legitimacy
ofthe Greek government. By this time Athens was a distant political entity for many Greeks.
People's loyalties often were with their local communities and families and it was in these areas
where the guerrilla influence was strongest. The third purpose of"Operation Dawn" was to
damage the strength and morale of the DAG. The operation was a general success in that 409
guerrillas were killed, 843 were captured, and 188 surrendered. 64 The GNA was invigorated and
the Greek Government was able to claim a minor victory against the guerrilla insurrection.
Following the success of"Operation Dawn," Van Fleet turned his attention to the major
offensive move being planned for late spring. This plan was called "Operation Crown" and its
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objective was to launch a three sided attack on the "crown" of the Granunos Mountains where
Markos maintained his headquarters. 65 The GNA would approach from the north, east, and west
and cut off the guerrillas that attempted to escape. During the preparations for this operation,
Greek military leaders and politicians were continuing to request such things as "bombers,
flame-throwers, direct fire weapons, gas, more artillery, armored cars and a larger army." Van
Fleet opposed most of these requests on the grounds that they were "impractical for use in
Greece," and he was deeply concerned that the documents had been leaked to the press.66 He
believed that the perception could be that the army was inadequately staffed and armed and it
could further undermine troop morale. Van Fleet wrote to the Undersecretary of War William
Draper in July of 1948, "I hope I can it make it clear that what Greece needs is victory this year,
and eventually a better army and not a bigger army."67
By August, 'A' Corps had captured the crown of Granunos and the supply lines to
Albania were cut off. Markos retreated into the Vitsi region along with his remaining DAG
forces. Though Van Fleet believed that the operation was a success, it revealed many of the
inadequacies of the Greek military. The GNA had demonstrated that although it possessed the
"will to win," it also showed its leadership's lack of aggression. At a meeting with Prime
Minister Sofoulis in July 1948, Van Fleet criticized the performance of the 'B' Corps
commander General Kalogeropolous. Van Fleet noted that during the Granunos operation 'B'
Corps had "crushed the front lines of the enemy on six different occasions and in each case failed
to exploit the breakthrough." For this reason, Van Fleet recommended General Kalogeropolous'
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removal. 68 Van Fleet recommended for Kalogeropolous' replacement a member of the GGS
named General Kitrilakis. Sofoulis agreed to both recommendations but was concerned about
the impact on the performance of the GGS with Kitrilakis' absence. Van Fleet reassured him
that any probl ems would be made up by superior performance as commander of' B' corp.
During this meeting, Sofoulis brought up the possibility of relieving General Yiantzis of his
command on the grounds that he too did, "not have the force and aggressiveness which is
required by the CG, GGS, and that he has not carried out all of the powers given him as
Commander-in-Chief." Van Fleet disagreed with Sofoulis for the time being and recommended
keeping Yiantzis on board although within a few months his attitude changed and Van Fleet too
was advocating his replacement. This lack of aggressiveness amongst some of the military
leaders was further demonstrated when in September; the GNA launched several haphazard
attacks on DAG strongholds in the Vitsi region. 69 These efforts were largely unsuccessful and
afterward Van Fleet successfully pushed for the removal of several more generals through forced
retirement. 70
It was around this time that Van Fleet first made contact with General Alexander
Papagos. Papagos was a semi-retired distinguished military figure who was known for his
successful leadership during the Albanian War against Italy in 1940 and for not being affiliated
with any ofthe political parties. 71 Van Fleet met with Papagos in August of 1948 to discuss the
general situation in Greece and to gauge his views on what could be·done. Papagos expressed
concern about the lack of small unit training amongst the GNA and the need to promote qualified
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junior officers and, "not necessarily in accordance with seniority." 72 During this meeting, Van
Fleet found himself in general agreement with Papagos about the nature of the Greek conflict
and their mutual understanding about what had to be done. As the year went on the two became
increasingly close and began shifting the basic strategy that they were going to apply. Up to that
point, the GNA had been focusing on geographical and territorial cleansing. Over the next few
months, Van Fleet and Papagos decided that it was important not to focus on capturing territory
but rather to destroy the guerrilla forces outright. As Van Fleet had noted earlier, there was now
only one method available, "either capture or kill them." 73
The first attempt at implementing this new strategy came in late 1948 during "Operation
Pigeon."74 The plan was to begin in the south and with small units gradually and systematically
move northward. As the order stated, the GNA should, "not be interested to capture objectives,
but to find and strike the bandits."75 Similar strategies had been employed earlier during the
GNA' s campaign but their efforts had been undermined by guerrilla intelligence and their
network of informants. In early December, before the operation was to commence, Greek forces
moved into the towns and villages around the guerrilla strongholds and captured thousands of
suspected informants. They were then moved to distant areas where they underwent
"reeducation" programs. Following this pre-operation cleanup, Van Fleet controversially
asserted that, "During a guerrilla war, the government which is being undermined should be
under no obligation to protect the rights of persons who are suspected of aiding the enemy,
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whether or not they are wearing a unifonn." 76 Such a policy clearly undermined the stated
objectives of the Truman Doctrine which sought the preservation of western liberal values, and
Van Fleet never made an effort to reconcile these two things without appeals to utilitarian
calculus. Years later Van Fleet never apologized for these decisions. He believed that the
atrocities committed by the "international gangsters" were far worse than any perpetuated by the
Greek government.
"Operation Pigeon" continued through February of 1949. The final result was evidence
that the Greek Anny had finally embraced the level of aggressiveness that Van Fleet found
appropriate. Nearly 5000 DAG forces were captured or killed. "Operation Pigeon" was
considered a significant success in GNA's campaign against the DGA forces. The GNA's
morale was raised and they had inflicted a major blow against the guerrilla forces. Despite these
gains though, the conflict was far from over. The DAG still maintained a strong position in the
Grammos and Vitsi regions and were still being aided by the local populations and foreign
sources. As 1948 came to a close, there was great uncertainty regarding the future course of the
conflict. In the coming months, Van Fleet, with the aid of the King and Queen, pushed for
further changes in the military and political leadership.

Van Fleet and Greek Final Victory 1949
While Van Fleet was maneuvering through the diplomatic and political currents of the
Greek military, the leadership of the KKE was suffering from its own power struggles. The
tension between "General" Markos and the former DAG commander Zachariades had been
intensifying throughout 1948. Markos favored continuing to employ guerrilla tactics against the
Greek government while Zachariades preferred waging a conventional war. Apart from these
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strategic differences, there were also conflicts over the broader strategic objectives of the KKE.
Markos was a nationalist partisan who favored an independent Greece with a communist
ideological orientation. Zachariades was fervently pro-Stalinist and favored maintaining closer
ties to the Cominform. Zachariades came into further conflict with Marshall Tito in Yugoslavia
following the so-called Tito-Stalin split that occurred earlier in 1948. Although these conflicts
seem to be significant but they were often accompanied by tribal infighting which proved to be
very problematic for the DAG in as it isolated them from their numerous allies and supporters
across the border. As the conflict escaladed, Yugoslavia eventually sealed its borders thus
cutting the DAG off from a vital supply line. 77
By January of 1949, a political crisis emerged that challenged the legitimacy of the Greek
government and its leaders. King Paul informed the leaders of the political parties that if they
were unable to reach a coalition agreement, then he would dissolve the parliament and
implement another solution. The implication was well understood by those present that the other
solution was an extra-constitutional one that might lead to a dictatorial figure. In a rare example
of consensus between Van Fleet and Grady, they both agreed that if things did not improve "We
should not oppose an extra-parliamentary solution as a last resort and as a natural evolution."78
On January 15, Sofoulis resigned as Prime Minister and the political parties immediately went
into negotiations. Ultimately though no extra-parliamentary maneuvers were necessary as a
compromise was reached within a few days. The agreement called for broad representation of all
four major political parties and that Sofoulis would remain Prime Minister, Alexander Diomedes
(a non-partisan political figure) became Deputy Prime Minister, and Tsaldaris remained Foreign
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Minister. 79 The parliament approved these measures with a vote of confidence the following
month. The most significant thing that emerged from this political crisis though was the
appointment of General Papagos as Commander-in-Chief of the GNA.
By the end of 1948, Van Fleet had abandoned bis previous view that General Yiantzis
should remain head of GGS. His age and ineffectiveness were becoming more and more
apparent and Van Fleet decided that he had to be removed and that General Papagos should take
his place as Commander-in-Chief of the Greek National Army. Grady later claimed that Van
Fleet and King Paul supported positioning Papagos as Prime Minister. There had been talks
throughout 1948 about bringing General Papagos into a government and providing him with
broad discretionary powers, but these never went any further than informal discussions. Grady
later claimed that he saved the King and Van Fleet from making a huge mistake by convincing
them that "little dictatorships tend to become big ones. " 80 Van Fleet believed that the key to
success at this point was the appointment of General Papagos as commander-in-chief and
providing him with the support he needed to effectively combat the guerrillas. Despite Grady's
efforts, Queen Fredericka and King Paul supported Van Fleet's position with respect to General
Papagos. Secretary Marshall had extended his support for such a measure during a visit to
Greece earlier in 1948. The cabinet was in general agreement and on January 21 General
Papagos was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the GNA. In this new position, Papagos was
given the exclusive power to appoint and remove senior military leaders and declare martial law.
As the head of the GGS and GNA, General Papagos had finally been given the authority and
independence that Van Fleet had suggested in early 1948.
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Shortly after assuming command ofthe General Staff, Papagos sent a memorandum to all
GNA personnel entitled, "Measures Against any Faintheartedness or Inactivity." This memo
reflected the views ofVan Fleet as much as they did Papagos'. In the message, he praised the
spirit ofthe Greek warrior while eviscerating those he feels have undermined the overall war
effort. He was particularly critical ofthose he believes did not measure up to the image he
expected ofa Greek soldier because oflaziness or cowardice. In the memo, Papagos stated that
he will, "SPARE NO STRONG MEASURE," against those who stand in the way ofthe GNA's
objective ofimposing, "order by means oftotal extermination ofthe communist banditry." 81
Anyone guilty of these infractions was subject to on the spot execution. Van Fleet and Papagos
were in general agreement about the overall approach to the conduct ofthe war. Hard-line
effective training, quality leadership, and the "will to win," all had to be employed ifthe GNA
was to be successful against the DAG forces.
In the first few months oftheir new partnership, Van Fleet and Papagos were faced with
several challenges. One ofthem was the continuing inability ofsome Greek commanders to
properly coordinate their activities. The GNA had been reorganized in such a way as to relieve it
ofits static role and to ensure that it :functioned as a mobile force. Several commanders in 'C'
Corps were continuing to spread out their forces to placate local political authorities and this
prevented them from functioning as a cohesive and mobile unit. Van Fleet described this
problem as "an outstanding example of trying to be strong everywhere and being strong
nowhere. "82 Papagos concurred with Van Fleet's assessment and he issued new orders to all
local commanders requiring them to maintain specific levels of reserves.
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It should be noted that Van Fleet was not always in agreement with Papagos on matters
of military policy. Throughout much of his tenure, Papagos supported expanding the GNA
beyond the 150,000 limit that had been approved the previous year. Papagos went so far as to
threaten to resign his position in four months if his demands for an enlargement up to 250,000
men was not met. Van Fleet was in agreement with Grady that it was an unnecessary use of
resources and that expansion was not the key to success. 83 This did not stop Grady though from
continually going behind Van Fleet's back to Marshall and others at the State Department. He
claimed that Van Fleet was actively intriguing against the government and did not have a solid
grasp of the situation and its complexities. In a memo to Marshall, Grady maintained that, "The
key to success according to JUSMAPG thinking is always to more: more men, more money and
more equipment." 84 This was incorrect of course as Van Fleet had repeatedly opposed the
expansion of personnel, equipment, and funds. Van Fleet maintained throughout his time in
Greece that the real key to success was an improvement of the quality of the GNA and that it was
not simply a matter of numbers and frre power. This difference in opinion though never
undermined Van Fleet and Papagos' working relationship. They continued to work effectively
with one another and their mutual respect never wavered.
In March, Van Fleet developed a plan to begin arming the civilian populations of the
Peloponnese. The objective was to provide local villagers with a means of protecting themselves
against DAG guerrillas .. ·This was a highly controversial move and Van Fleet lobbied for it on
the grounds that he believed that the Greek population would be more willing to fight for their
government if they had the means of doing it. The proposal called for disbanding some of the
local Home Guard Units that proved "unsatisfactory and undependable." Additionally it called
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for the distribution of several thousand Enfield rifles through the British Military Mission. Van
Fleet suggested that arming the population released the GNA forces from their local
responsibilities and allowed them to be able to participate in operations elsewhere in Greece. 85
By May of 1949, nearly 36,000 rifles had been issued to civilian forces. This did in fact free up
many Greek troops as they were able to participate in the next major offensive, "Operation
Rocket."
In May of 1949, the GNA commenced "Operation Rocket." This was designed to
employ the strategy developed by Van Fleet and Papagos the previous year by targeting 4,500
guerrillas positioned in the areas west of Athens. The operation proved to be an enormous
success. Van Fleet was optimistic about the operation and in an interview noted that the reason
for the operation's success was that "The Greek soldier knows how to march toward Victory,
indifferent about death." 86 Although the GNA had certainly improved itself dramatically in the
previous year and a half, an additional explanation for the success in "Operation Rocket" was
that that the DAG had by this time embraced the Zachariades plan of employing conventional
military tactics against the GNA. While their previous attacks had been scattered and
decentralized, the new DAG approach was to confront the GNA directly in large numbers. The
numbers for this conflict speak for themselves as the GNA lost 200 men compared to nearly
3,200 for the DAG. 87
Additionally, the Yugoslavian border was sealed by this point. Although Van Fleet later
criticized those who attributed success of the GNA to the Tito-Stalin split and noted that Tito,
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"stated he was closing the border. But he didn't and he couldn't." 88 Van Fleet argued that the
border remained open despite Tito's efforts and supplies and weapons continued to be funneled
across the border. Although Van Fleet was correct that guerrillas and supplies continued to
move across the border after Tito's announcement, it cannot be doubted that the official closing
of the border caused a disruption in the supply lines from Yugoslavia to Greece and this greatly
contributed to the GNA victory. It was not the sole cause for the success of "Operation Rocket"
but it was an important one.
Throughout 1949, the OGS had planned a large offensive against the guerrilla
strongholds of Grammos and Vitsi. Known as "Operation Torch," this was the largest operation
up to that point and its objective was to target the nearly 8,000 guerrillas positioned there. In
July of 1949, the ONA commenced "Operation Torch." The plan involved bombing the guerrilla
fortifications with an air and artillery assault after which the ONA would launch a direct assault
on the guerrilla forces. The assault was to be divided into two sections "A" and "B" with "A"
acting as a diversionary force near Grammos. Additionally the ONA was to seal off their
possible escape across the border by positioning government forces along the rear of the area. 89
The bombings began in late July, and in early August, "Torch A" was launched. This first part
was a success and "Torch B" followed in the Vitsi area. The last guerrilla stronghold in Vitsi fell
in late August and the last of the bandits retreated into Albania. Van Fleet wrote to Papagos
praising him for his efforts noting that "The operation has progressed according to your
decisions," and that "American observers everywhere pay high tribute to the heroic soldiers and
airmen of the Greek National Forces."90 In Albania, the retreating forces were captured and
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detained by the Albanian government. As a response to international pressure and the fall-out of
the Tito-Stalin split, Albania was no longer interested in supporting the partisan cause. The
ceasefire was officially announced in October and the Greek Civil War was brought to an end.
The total body count by the end of 1949 was 60,000 Greeks dead and nearly 800,000 displaced
from their homes. 91 Van Fleet remained in Greece until mid-1950 and the U.S. military mission
ended shortly after.
Conclusion
The Proconsul of Greece: The Myth of General James Van Fleet

There is considerable disagreement amongst scholars regarding the nature and success of
the Truman Doctrine and General Van Fleet's role in its implementation. It is difficult to cut
through the myth that has been crafted around him and his activities in Greece. Indeed, Van Fleet
noticed this same problem during his time in Greece. In a letter to his friend Cardinal Spellman
in early 1948, Van Fleet said, "all kinds of dishonest charges are made against the Greek Army
(and myselfl)."92 Van Fleet's position in Greece and the role of the United States were
continually misunderstood by many people in Greece. Several letters were received from Greek
citizens to Van Fleet hoping that he could influence legislation for them or assist in releasing
their relatives from prison.93
From the point of view of the U.S., was the Truman Doctrine a success and to what
extent did Van Fleet impact that success? The answer to this question ultimately rests on how
n
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Greece into its sphere of influence, assuming that this was ever an actual objective. It can just
easily be called a success if it the objective was to prevent any other communist-inspired
movement from taking power in Greece. This success though was dependent on a number of
other factors separate from U.S. intervention. Among those included the general disadvantage of
the DAG in terms of numbers, equipment, and morale. Additionally, the reduction of aid to the
guerrillas in 1949 certainly contributed to their defeat. The KK.E was never able to consolidate its
political influence to any considerable degree and as a result it was forced to embrace civil war
as the most viable option for pursuing political power. 94
U.S. intervention in Greece produced a number of other results that were not as
celebrated. The Truman Doctrine established a precedent for U.S. intervention abroad that found
varying degrees of success and failure in places such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East.
Additionally, the Truman Doctrine as a policy in practice differed enormously from the rhetoric
used in Truman's March 1947 speech to Congress. Very quickly, the U.S. was forced to
abandon any pretext of defending freedom, democracy, and self-determination in favor of police
state tactics, direct interference, and extra-parliamentary maneuvers.
Van Fleet's own role in these events is just as complex. Van Fleet wielded considerable
influence during his time as Director of the JUSMAPG but he is by no means the Proconsul
figure that some have made him out to be. He could not veto policies by blinking nor did he
manipulate the rise and fall of governments over night.95 In early 1950, as the American military
presence in Greece was being gradually reduced, Van Fleet was approached by an agent of the
General Nicholas Plastiras (who had just won a substantial majority in the most recent election).
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Plastiras requested a "secret" meeting with Van Fleet. Van Fleet refused to meet with him on the
grounds that it was and would appear inappropriate. 96 In a highly uncharacteristic fashion, Van
Fleet later skewered Plastiras in several memos and communiques to the State Department. He
claimed that under Plastiras, "the Communists and fellow travelers have gradually regained their
morale and influence and many are now in important positions." He commented how the new
government granted amnesty to "war criminals" and relieved many police and gendarmerie
officials. 97 It is clear that by early 1950, Van Fleet's influence on Greek politics was waning.
The new government that emerged in 1950 was a centrist coalition that resisted royal
intervention and many of their policies were generally more conciliatory than the previous ones.
Van Fleet's concerns were sincere but unwarranted and his general tone in these messages was
reflective of the broader change in the Cold War mentality. No longer was the Greek Civil War
seen as a domestic matter with regional implications. By this time, the Cold War had become a
global political struggle and internal threats were seen as international bandits.
In matters of military policy, it is true that he maintained a significant presence during
1948 and 1949. Van Fleet himself said that, "I really had no orders from Washington that I
would command the Greek forces, but in practice I actually did. "98 Though it can be said that
this influence was made possible by the intervention of the royal family and in particular Queen
Frederica. What can be said with certainty is that Van Fleet proved to be a highly effective
diplomatic figure despite serving in a military capacity. He was forced to wield multiple skill
sets to protect the interests of the Truman Doctrine Aid program and to ensure an effective and
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efficient Greek Anny. ·,h::.1 E;eet characterized his role in Greece as "Coach Van Fleet."99 In
many ways this is an appropriate description. In navigating the highly complex and difficult
waters that bureaucratic politics is, Van Fleet was forced to coach from along the sidelines by
providing advice, by negotiating, and by maneuvering himself in such a way as to ensure the
careful implementation of the Truman Doctrine.
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